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iT. CASUAL reading of the popular discussion of
stabilization pohey over the past four or five years
would suggest that the definition of a monetarist was
firmly established. In the monetarist camp are Milton
Friedman, Karl Brunner, Allan Meltzer, and the model
of the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank. Among the
nonmonetarists are Waiter Heller, Gardner Ackley,
Arthur Okun, James Tobin, and the large econome-
tric models such as the Wharton model and the FRB-
MIT model. Sometimes the distinction between the
two groups has been summarized in the allegation
that a monetarist is one who not only believes that
money matters, but also believes that money is the
only thing which matters,1
A close reading of the writings of those associated
with both points of view, suggests that distinctions are
not completely clear at the level of monetary theory.
Leonall C. Andersen has characterized the mone-
tarist position on stabilization pohcy as holding that
“the major impact of monetary actions is ... on long-
run movements in nominal economic variables such as
nominal GNP, the general price level, and market in-
terest rates. Long-run movements in real economic
variables such as output and employment are eon~
sidered to be little influenced, if at all, by monetary
actions.”2 On the other hand he admits a clear role
for fiscal policy, if not the eonventiona~stabilization
policy role: “their [fiscal actions] main impact is on
1ong~runmovements of real output In the short
run, fiscal actions exert some but little Iasth~gin-
fluence on nominal GNP expansion and, therefore,
have little effect on short-run movements of output
and employment.”3
‘Walter W. Heller, “Is Monetary Policy Being Oversold?”, in
Milton Friedman and Walter W. Heller, Monetary us. Fiscal
Policy (New York: W,W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1969), p. 16. 2Leonall C. Andersen, “A Monetarist Vjew of Demand Man-
agement: The United States Experience,” this Review (Sep~
tember 1971), p. 4.
~Ibid.,p. 4.
The question is what theoretical framework can
produce these types of conclusions, and can it be
tested? Again quoting the Andersen paper, “monetary
actions .. .are considered a disturbance which infhj-
enees the acquisition of financial and real assets. Rates
of rethrn on real and financial assets and market prices
adjust to create a new equilibrium position of the
economy; therefore these changes are considered the
main channels of monetary influence on aggregate
demand.”4
Thus the monetarist conception of what has been
called the transmission mechanism is one of monetary
disturbances which change interest rates and the rela-
tive prices of real and financial assets. Such changes
induce a reallocation of asset portfolios which can in-
clude changes in the demand for real assets. Finally,
the portfolio adjustments and relative price changes
can change the demand for consumables. In an earlier
article in this Review, Karl Brunner characterizes a
similar position as the “weak monetarist thesis.”5
This construct of the world is apparently one which
is widely accepted among monetary economists today
and thus does not discriminate among the monetarist
and nonmonetarist positions. Certainly a whole suc-
cession of writings by James Tobin suggests an ex-
planation quite consistent with this view of the trans~
mission mechanism of monetary po1icy.~In fact, An-
dersen admits that he would view his mechanism as
“close to the Tobin view, except that it takes into
ctonsicleration many more rates of return and market
prices of goods and services.”7 An examination of the
~Ihid., p. 3 (italics are added).
~Kar1 Brunner, “The Role of Money and Monetary Policy,’>
this Review (July 1968), pp. 18-19.
GJames Tobin, “An Essay on Principles of Debt Management,”
in Commission on Money and Credit, Fiscal and Debt
Management Policies (Engiewood Cliff, N.J.: Prentice-Hall
Inc., 1963) pp. 143-2i8~ and, “A General Equilibrium Ap~
proach to Monetary Theory, Journal of Money, Credit and
Banking (Febniary 1969) pp. 15-29. 7Andersen, “A Monetarist View,” p. 3.
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writings of other nonmonetarist economists will show
similar consistencies with this view of the transmission
mnechanism. Therefore “~veakmonetarism,” as a the-
oretical position, does not appear to be a monopoly
of the monetarists.
Given this apparent agreement on the theoretical
basis of the mechanism through which monetary policy
actions affect the economy, one can question whether
the “monetarist counterrevolution” is more than an
attempt at product differentiation, such as economists
usually associate with monopolistic compelition. A
pragmatic view of the discussion suggests that at least
four substantive issues are invoIved~(1) the usefulness
of the IS-LM aggregate demand framework for policy
formulation; (2) the dynamic adjustment of the econ-
omy to a new equilibrium aftei- a policy shock; (3)
the mode of conduct of monetary policy; and (4) an
econometric issue of large versus small models.
Limitations of Policy Prescriptions from the
IS~LMFramework
A major source of monetarist criticism has been the
use of the IS-LM framework for aggregative policy
analysis. In this Review, Ronald Teigen has attempted
to defend the IS~LMframework from one monetarist
accusation that this framework holds that an increase
in the stock of money lowers the interest rate and
raises output.8 He demonstrates that with certain
assumptions about the relative speeds of adjustment
of various markets, it is possible to show that interest
rates over time ~vi1Ifirst fall and then rise again as
the system returns to a new equilibrium.
At the same time Teigen admits that this framework
has ignored price expectations, and in addition, that
it is not easy to incorporate price expectations, a dy-
namic phenomenon, into the static frarnewoi-k. This
appears to sidestep the crux of the monetarist com-
plaints. Not only does the conventional IS-LM analysis
ignore price expectations, but it usually ignores effects
from changes in the level of prices. The omission of
such price level effects is possible only when the
macroeconomic model 5s specified totally in terms of
real flow variables. In sophisticated analysis. such as
that of Martin Bailey, price level effec~of various
kinds arc introduced, and it can be shown that the
position of either the IS or the LM curve (in the
interest rate - real income plane) is dependent upon
the current price level,9
~Rona1d L. Teigen, “A Critical Look at Monetanst Economics,”
this issue of the Review, pp. I9~2O.
°Martin Bailey, National Income and the Price Level (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1962).
Most macro-economists will acknowle4ge the valid-
ity of the price level effect on the LM curve arising
from the specification of the demand for money as a
demand for real balances. Similarly, a specification of
the consumption function in terms of income and
wealth as implied by a permanent income or “life-
cycle” hypothesis will generate a family of IS curves,
one for each level of real wealth1°Once both are con-
structed as functions of the price level, any policy
action which generates a change in the price level will
not o~
1
yhave a direct impact on the IS (fiscal policy)
or the LM (monetary policy) etirve, but also will
cause additional shifts in both curves through the
changes in the price level, Under these circumstances,
simple multiplier calculations do not adequately rep-
resent the reaction of the economy to the policy ac6on.
Accurate policy conclusions cannot be derived with-
out estimates of the parameters of the system.
The situation is further complicated when it is as-
sumed that monetary policy can affect the market
value of assets, such as corporate equities, through
induced changes in the rate of return on these assets,
Then the specification of a consumption-wealth re1a~
tionship implies that any change in interest rates will
induce a shIft in the IS curve.
Teigen has already indicated that it is difficult, if
not impossible, to incorporate dynamic phenomenon
such as price expectaUons into the static framework
of this construct,tt Yet, as the monetarists have rightly
pointed out, adjustments in specified behavioral rela-
tionships have to be made for such expectations under
conditions of anticipated inflation (and particularly
when the rate of inflation is anticipated to be
changing).
It appears that the monetarists have justifiable com-
plaints with the policy analysis derived from this
framework, which is common to popular macroeco-
nomic textbooks and past annual reports of the
Council of Economic Advisers, even if one is pre-
pared to accept the proposition that there are no deep
theoretical differences in the transmission mechanism
for monetary mid fiscal policy.
In many respects the monetarist attack on the
IS-LM framework is fighling a “straw man.” Many of
the limitations of this highly aggregative framework,
such as those indicated above, have been attacked in
~
0
It is not I~ecessaryto assume this kind of consumption ftrnc-
hon to generate such a family of curves. Price elasticities of
imports and exports with respect to domestic and foreign
prices, or income tax functions which have nominal income
elasticity greater than one, will generate the same effect.
“Teigeri. “A Critical Look,” p. 19.
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larger econometric models of income determination.
This is not to say that these models have captured the
various effects with a high degree of precision. In
particular, the econometric problem of estimating dis-
tributed lags has proven particularly difficult, thus the
timing of responses to policy actions as implied by
large statistical models is a major area of uncertainty
at the present time.
The Process of Adjustment to Policy Actions
A close reading of the monetarist evaluation of the
relative strengths of monetary and fiscal policy leaves
the impression that they are not quite talking about
the same thing as the nonmonetarists. This can be
illustrated by the first quote from Andersen, above,
which sets out the transmission of monetary policy on
the economy as the adjustment of rates of return and
prices to a new equilibrium (in the absence of further
exogenousshocks). A similar characterization has been
made in a recent analysis by Friedman in which he
distinguishes ‘Keynesian” analysis as a framework in
which prices are assumed exogenously constant.12
Most empirical models of income determination to-
day regard the price ]evel as endogenously deter-
mined, with the independent variables in the price
level equation specified as money wage rates and
productivity separately or in a composite form as unit
labor costs.1~In addition, money wage rates are usu-
ally assumed to be endogenous variables in such
models. The behavior of wage rates in such models is
usually specified to follow a modified version of the
“Phillips Curve,”4 This specification is a disequilib-
rium mechanism which holds that, in the presence of
an excess demand or supply in the labor market (usil-
ally measured by the unemployment rate), money
wage rates will change. However, it says nothing
about the nature of the equilibrium toward which the
market is presumab’y adjusting. This is a modification
of the early post-Keynesian models in which the
money wage rate was taken theoretically, if not em-
pirically, as fixed in the short run.
l
2
Mjlton Friedman, “A Theoretical Framework for Monetary
Analysis,” Journal of Political Economy (March/April 1970),
pp. 193-238. 13
See Lawrence H. Klein and Michael K. Evans, The Whar-
ton Economic Forecacting Model, 2nd ed., (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania, 1968); Robert Rasehe and
Harold T. Shapiro, “The F.R.B.-M.LT. Econometric Modd:
Its Special Features,” American Economic Review, Papers
and Proceedings (May 1968), pp. 123~49; and Otto Eck-
stein and Gary Fromm, “~1~he Price Equation,” American
Economic Renew (December 1968) pp. 1159-1183.
‘~A.W. Phillips, “Tho Relaticmship Between Unemployment
and the Rate of Change of Money Wage Rates in the
United Kingdom, 1861-1957.” Economica (November 1958),
pp. 283-299.
It seems appropriate to conclude that the rnone-
tarists and their opponents are discussing policy effects
on the economy over two different time spans. The
nonmonetarists have implicitly concerned themselves
with models in which the labor market, at least, re-
mained in disequilibrium. The monetarists on the
other hand, in discussing policy impacts when the
new equilibrium position of the economy” has been
achieved, implicitly appear to be concerned with the
period of time in which all markets, including the
labor market, have adjusted themselves to the policy
shock. The recent reinterpretation of the General
Theory by Leijonhufvud offers an explanatioll of this
debate in terms of the dynamics of the labor market.
He argues:
The revolutionary impact of Keynesian Economies
on contemporary thought stemmed in the rnaiu, we
have argued, from Keynes’ reversal of the couven—
tional rai~kingof price and quantity velocities. iii the
Keynesian models price vdocities are not infinite; it
is sometimes said that the impli ahons of the model
result from the assumption that mofle’- wages are
“rigid”. This usage can he misleading. Income—con-
strained proceses result not only when price—level
velocity is zero, but whenez~erit IS short of infinite.1
5
He further argues that this is an appropriate as-
sumption if there are substantial information costs as-
sociated with trading in the labor market, as recent
theories of labor market behavior have poswlated: 1~
in the absence of perfect k-nowleclge m the part of
transacting nits )r of anv mechanism iinrelated to
the 1,-ailing process itself that woidd supply the
needed inforrnati)ri co,itlesslq. the presumption of
infinite price v&oc:itv disappears.
17
Unfortullately, little attention has been given to
empirical investigation of the process by which labor
markets adjust to equilibrium. This adjustment pro-
cess has significant implications for the reaction of all
economic system to pure fiscal policy changes such
as increased government expenditures on goods and
services and increased real disposable income of con-
sumers through tax reductions unaccomparned by in-
creases in the money stock.
Acceptance of the Kev~esianconcepts of a con-
sumption function and an interest dasticity of the
‘~Axe1Leijonhufvud, On Keynesian Economics and The Eca-
,lo,ntc~of Keynes (New York: Oxford, 1968), p. 6t.
‘°Armen A. Alehian, “Information Costs, Pricing, and Re-
source Unemployment,” pp. 27-52, and Charles C. Holt,
“Job Search, Phillips’ Wage Relations and Union Influence:
Theory and Evidence,” p. 53-123, both in ES. Phelps et. al.
Microcconomic Foundations of Unemployment and Inflation
(New York: \V.W. Norton & Co., 1970),
liLeijonhufvud, On Keynesian Economics, p. 69.
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demand for real cash balances, does not imply in-
creases in output and employment from the above
types of fiscal policy actions if the labor market is al-
lowed to adjust to the equilibrium si~pp1yand de-
mand functions which prevailed before the policy
shock.’8 The restoration of such an equilibrium im-
plies the same realoutput and employment which pre-
vailed before the policy action, that is complete
crowding out” of the fiscal stimulus in real terms.
\Vhich elements of real private demand are displaced
by the fiscal stimulus ~vi1Idepend on the specifica-
tions of the sector demand functions.
If the money demand function is completely interest
inelastic then, when the new equilibrium is achieved,
velocity must be unchanged in the absence of an
accommodating monetary expansion, and complete
“crowding out” must also occur in nominal terms. With
an interest elastic money demand function, higher
prices can occur in the new equilibrium as a result of
higher nominal interest rates. In this case complete
“crowding out” ~viIlnot occur in nominal terms.
The results of this model are consistent with the
nionetanst position on the role of fiscal policy as out~
lined by Andersen and others. Therefore, if the ad-
justment process in the labor market is relatively
rapid, then the weight would seem to be with the
monetarist contention that fiscal policy is a relatively
weak tool for short-run stabilization. On the other
hand, if the adjustment is very slow, “transitory im-
pacts” of fiscal policy actions of the type usually dc-
rived from income determination models exist, and
way have an important role in stabilization policy.”
The Conduct of Monetary Policy
A consistent characteristic of the monetarist posi-
tion is the insistence that monetary policy should be
conducted in terms of controlling the rate of growth
of monetary aggregates rather than controlling inter-
est rates or money market conditions. This position
~an be traced hack at least as far as early post-war
proposa’s of Friedman during the period when the
Federal Reserve was still supporting the price of
Government debt.2°
In support of this position, the monetarists have
developed a number of valid objections to the money
market approach. First, they would hold that the view
‘~Gardner Ackley, Macroeconomic Theory (New York:
Maciniflan, 1961), pp. 382-387.
9
1t is noteworthy in this respect that Friedman seems to
always he carefu] to acknowledge that there are short—run
‘transitory” effects of fiscal policy actions on real output
and employment. 2
°Milton Friedman. A Prog,am for Monetary Stability (New
York: Fordham University Press, 1959).
that monetary influences are channeled to aggregate
demand only through impacts of interest rates on in~
vestment demand is too narrow a view of the role of
monetary policy. It has been argued above that there
exists fairly widespread support for this argument to-
clay, at least as a theoretical position. Second, they
would argue that observed market rates of interest
are nominal rates, and that in times of changing ex-
pectations of future inflation rates, the relevant inter-
est rates for economic dcci ionmaking are ex-ante real
rates of interest — nominal rates less the anticipated
rate of future inflation. Under these circumstances it
is possible that changes in nominal interest rates may
give a completely wrong impression of what is really
happening in terms of real rates of return.
As an example of this, the St. Louis Federal Reserve
Bank has published from time to time over the past
several years, estimates of a real interest rate series
which proposes to measure long-term yield such as
the corporate bond rate adjusted for inflationary an-
ticipations. The contrast in the behavior of this series
and the corresponding nominal series is quite striking.
It is well known that the nominal series has achieved
historically high levels in the past several years. On
the other hand, the proxy for the real rate has re-
mained remarkably steady over the latter part of the
decade. One can object, of course, to the techniques
used to approximate this series. Nevertheless, the
monetarists have made a valuable contribution in em-
phasizing this distinction, because the existence of
“inflation premiums” in market interest rates, particu-
larly long-term rates, over the past several years is
now widely acknowledged.2’
An additional argument which has not been ad-
vanced by the monetarists to my knowledge, can be
derived from recent work in investment theory. Con-
siderable empiric~iltesting has now been done on the
neoclassical theory of investment which is most closely
associated with the work of Jorgenson.22 This theory
indicates that interest rates are but one component
of the quasi rent on new capital, which is a postu-
21
For example, “Financial Developments in the Third Quarter
of 1971,” Federal Reserve Bulletin (November 1971), p.
871, states:
The key factor contributing to interest rate de-
clines, however, was the marked change in market
expectations triggered by the President’s new eco-
nomic program. Expectations of inflation, and hence
the inflationary premium on interest rates, appear to
have been reduced by the temporary freeze on wages
and prices and by the indication that a program of
strong eontinuing controls would follow. 22
flobert E. Hall and Dale V~.Jorgenson, ~Appheatmri of the
Theory of Optimum Capital Accumulation, ‘ pp. 9-60, and
Charles W. Bisehoff, ‘The Effect of Alternative Lag Dis-
tributions,” pp. 61—130. both in Gary Fromm, ed., Tax
Incentives and Capital Spending (Washington: the Brook—
ings Ii~sbtution,1971).
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lated determinant of investment activity. Various tax
policy actions can also affect the rate of return on
capital, and it is the net effect of the changes in
interest rates and these tax policy actions which is the
relevant influence on investment behavior. In pai-ticu-
lar, in discussions of monetary policy in late 1971,
arguments that interest rates must be brought down
to stimulate investment may be overly emotional.
With the resumption of permanent tax credits on
equipment, and the reduction of useful lives allowed
for tax purposes earlier in the year thrrnigh the revi-
sion of Treasury regulations, it is likely that the net
effect on investment demand through the so called
“cost of capital” channel would be expansionary, even
if interest rates were to rise significantly over the first
part of next year.
If these arguments are valid in minimizing the im~
portance of money market conditions as the target of
monetary policy, then the question which remains to
be answered is why concentrate on the rate of growth
of monetary aggregates. It would seem that there is
nothing in the “weak monetarist thesis,” as outlined
above, which is sufficient to call for the conduct of
monetary policy in terms of controlling the rate of
growth of monetary aggregates. The theory must be
supplemented by additional hypotheses about the
short-run behavior of velocity.
Brunner establishes a necessary condition for this
policy orientation in what he calls the “strong mone~
tarist thesis,” which maintains that the variability of
monetary impulses is also large relative to the speed
at which the economy absorbs the impact of environ-
mental changes.2~It does not seem totally appropriate
to interpret this statement as holding that velocity is
(or must be) constant in the short run, as some recent
commentators seem to imply.24 All that appears nec-
essary is that if velocity changes, it mast change in a
manner which is predictable from the time path of
past or predicted future behavior of the money supply.
It can be demonstrated with currently popular formu-
lations of the money demand function that the lower
the short-run interest elasticity of the demand for
money, the more likely this condition will be met. We
shall return to this point in the next section where
some comments are presented on the St. Louis
equation.
Several remarks on the current state of empirical
research on the money demand function are appro-
23
Brunner, “The Role of Money and Monetary Policy,” p. 19. 2~
PauIA. Samuelson, “Reflections on the Merits and Demerits
of Monethrisrn,” hi James J. Diamond, ed., Li~nesin F~cal
and Monetary Policy: The Eclectic Economist Views The
Controversy (DePaul Universi~,1971), pp. 7-21.
priate at this point.2~It appears inappropriate to ar-
gue about the stability of the demand for money
function, in the sense that the aggregate demand for
real cash balances can be thought of as a stable func-
tion of a few pararneters.2~ This proposition has been
implicitly accepted by all empirical research into the
nature of this function.27 It is also true that most of
these studies have concluded that statistically signifi-
cant interest elasticifies of money demand do exist,
On the other hand the studies which have attempted
to distinguish between short-run and long-run interest
elasticities have consistently found that the shothrun
elasticities are quite small relative to the long-run
elasticities because of a relatively slow speed of ad-
justment back to the long-run function after a distur-
bance from an initial portfolio equilibrium position.
It should be noted that these propositions say
nothing about the control of the money stock through
open market operations aimed at money market con-
diticrns versus control through open market operations
aimed at reserve aggregate targets. This iss~ieinvolves
the elasticity of the supply function for money, rather
than the demand function, and goes beyond the scope
of the present discussion.
The St. Louis Equation
The discussion up to this point has centered on
monetarism as monetary theory and its prescriptions
for monetary policy. It seems appropriate to conclude
with some remarks on the St. Louis equation.
This regression has been the subject of varied inter-
pretation since it first appeared. In their original arti-
cle Andersen and Jordan state:
This artiele does not attempt to test rivai economic
theories of the mechanism by which monetary and
fiscal actions influence ecmomic activity. Neither is
it intended to develop evidence bearing direct
1 on
any causal relationships implied by such theories.
More e1ahorat~procedures thall those used here
~votiJd he required in order to Lest any theories under-
lying the familiar statements regarding results ex-
pected from monetary aml fiscal actions. Ho~vever,
empirical relationships are developed between fre—
quentlv used measures of stabilization actions and
econc>mieactivitv. These relationships are consistent
2~
Auseful summary of research on the money demand func-
tion is provided in David Laidier, The Demand to? Money:
Theories and Evidence (Scranton, Pa.: Internatrnnal Text-
book Co., 1969).
2GMllton Friedman, “The Quantity Theory of Money — A
Restatement,” in Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 3-21.
2T
The derivation of regression estimates of any function pre-
supposes stability of that function, in the }riedrnan sense,
over the sample period.
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with the implications of some theories of sLabiliza—
lion policy and are mconsjstent with others
A later article states:
This general specification represents the reduced
form for that class of structures which has ~M
[changes in money stock} and ~E [changes in Fed-
eral expenditures] as exogenous variables. In this
form the total spending equaLion remams uncom-
mitted as to structure; it is potentially consistent
with both Keynesian and quantity theory models.2°
In the latter article, it was also noted that equations
had been constructed using percentage ch&wgcs, rather
than first differences, and that the results were basi-
cally unaffected by the change in specification.
These equations and their established forecasting
properties have remained somewhat a mystery to uco-
nomists associated with the nonmonetarist position
and the tradition of large econometric models. It has
been subjected to numerous attacks Ofl the choice of
independent variables and problems of statistical
bias.3°In general it would appear that the equation
has withstood these attacks surprisingly (or disturb-
ingly) well.
We shall offer yet another interpretation of the St.
Louis eqintion which suggests that it is not a “reduced
form” of an unspecified system, but rather only one
component of the structural system. This interpreta-
tion of the St. Louis results is not sympathetic to the
view that the St. Louis equations are a competitive
econometric’ model of the United States economy.
Judged in this perspective, it is possible to rationalize
its forecasting performance,
5 5
(1) amY =cx +Z ~i MnM—~+ ~ y~MoE~~
jrrO jzzQ
where 1’ = GNP in current dollars
M = money stock
E = high—empIoymei~t Government expencli-
tures,
28
LeonaH C. Andersen and Jerry L. Jordan, “Monetary and
Fiscal Actions: A Test of Their Relative Importance in
Economic Stabilization,” this Review (November 1968),
p. 11.
29
LeonalI C. Andersen and Keith M. Carison, A Monetarist
Model for Economic Stabilization,” this Review (April
1970), p. 9.
30
Frarik de Leeuw and John Kalchbrenner, Monetary and
Fiscal Actions: A Test of their Relative Importance in
Economic Stabilization — Comment,” this Reuiew (April
1969), pp. 641; and Edward M. Cramlich, “The Useful-
ness of Monetary and Fiscal Policy as Discretionary Stabili-
zation lools, Journal of Money. Credit, and Banking
(May 1971), pp. 506-532.
This can in turn be conveniently trai~sforrnedinto a
velocity (V) equation:
(2) MnV = (a1nY-~1nM) = a + (I3o —1) AlnM
5 5
+ X~3~ AlnM-j + I
11
Recent empirical formulations of the demand for
money function specify that in the long run velocity
is a function of interest rates, aild assume that private
economic units adjust to their long-run equilibrium
cash balances with a lag. Such models can be trans-
formed into a specification :31
(3) MnV = y~ala g(r) + yj AIuM~+ ! ~i A1nMt—~
where r = interest rate.
If for the moment the interest rate term is ignored,
this equation appears quite similar to the transformed
Andersen-Jordan equation (I) above. It can be clearly
seen from this equation that such specifications of the
money demand ftincion relate changes in velocity to
current and lagged changes in the money stock ( all in
logarithms), It further suggests that changes in inter-
est rates will induce additional changes ill velocity.
Most economists would hold that changes in interest
rates and money stock are jointly determined, and
consequendy, forecasts from equation (1), ignoring
the induced changes on interest rates from changes in
the money stock, will cause forecasting errors. How-
ever, if the short-run üflercst dasticity of the money
demand function is very small, then ~w estimated
equation omitting this term would most likely produce
a credible forecasting record. In addition, it is likely
that the distributed lag on high-employment Govern-
ment expenditures used by Andersen and Jordan is
correlated with interest rates in both the sample and
post sample periods, and serves as an effective proxy
variable for forecasting purposes.32
Summary
Monetansm and the monetarist approach to de-
mand management has raised many issues in the past
several years which have significantly influenced the
attitudes of professional economists on the question of
i=1
Recognizing that percentage
mately equal to changes in
changes,the St. Louis equation
changes are approxi-
logarithms for small
can be rewritten as:
3~
SeeAppendix for the derivation.
32
Equatioos of the form of ( 3 ) have been estimated using the
data of the current St. Louis forecasting equations, both
with and without the high-employment expenditure varia-
bles. Space constraints permit only the comment that the
interest rate variable, either a short-term rate such as the
Treasury bill rate, or a long—terni rate such as the Cor-
porate Aaa rate, show up as high’y significant variables,
thongh with von low short—run elasticities, Even with the
interest rate variable in the specification, some of the co-
efficients in the distributed lag on high-employment ex~
penditures remain significant.
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how to pursue stabilization policy. Monetarist models Assume that in the long run velocity is a function of
have to date established a forecasting record which is interest rates:
credible when compared to the more entrenched in- (1) v=F( dF r) -— > C)
dr
come determination approach. or
Recently, considerable work has been done to ela- (2) NP= f3] Y=Yg(r) < o
borate an extensive theoretical framework which pur~ in addition private economic units are assumed to adjust
portedly underlies the pohcy prescriptions and the to their long run equilibrium cash balarne positions with
“reduced form” monetarist models of aggregate eco- a lag, which is usually specified as:
numb activity. The comments above suggest that M
much of this theoretical framework is shared with ~_7~[ ~M~]
economists of nonmonetarist persuasion, but that \Vhen this is expressed in logarithms ft becomes:




1 different views of the world exist. Unfortunately, few
attempts have been made by the monetarists and A more genera] formt of the distributed lag adjustment mechanism can be specified as:
nonmunetansts to identify the common and contrast-
ing elements of their theoretical constructs. Even less lnM=$
0
1nN1~-~fit lnM~ * ... +fi~ lnM~
1
work has been done to attempt to disprove the specific Substituting f01
M~gives:
hypotheses of market behavior in the areas of conflict, (5) lnM=$
0
in [g(r)]+ fib mY ±~$~ 1nM~
most of which, I believe, involve the dynamics of
price adjustments.33 Only as such analysis becomes which can be rewritten as a velocity equation:
available ~vil1we be able to resolve important policy
issues such as the relative strengths of fiscal and mone- (6) lnV=(lnY—lnM)= —$
0
1n [g(r)I+ (1—$~)mY— ~ /3~lnM_
1
tary actions under various conditions of the economy,
and the speed at which policy actions affect aggregate Taking first differences in the logs:
demand, employment, and prices. (7) A1n\’~=—f3
0
‘Sin [g(r)] + (1—$~)~S1nY—~ /3~iSlnM_
1
33
For example, Milton Friedman in, ‘A Theoretfeal Frame- which can be transfoimed to:
work, argues that a major unresolved issue h~his analysis
(as well as that of others) is the response of real output
and prices individually to policy shocks. (8) A1nV=—/3
0







Mn[g(r)]+(1 fl0) MnM— ~fl1
MnM~]
The purpose of this appendix is to demonstrate the ________
derivation of equation (3) in the text from a money
1
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